Cosmopolitan Security: A Model for Future Global Security?

Tom van der Hor[1]

This article defines cosmopolitan security and discusses it in relation to three other security perspectives: state-centred, multilateral and market-based security perspectives. From here it will try to analyze the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, applying the four perspectives in three stages: pre-conflict issues, outright conflict (war itself) and post-conflict issues. Finally, it will discuss opportunities and possible obstacles for cosmopolitan security as a future model for global security.

I.   Introduction

> *"We inhabit a world of multi-level, multi-centered security governance, in which states are joined, crisscrossed and contested by an array of transnational organizations and actors – whether in regional and global governmental bodies, commercial security outfits, or the rapidly expanding range of non-governmental organizations and social movements that compose transnational civil society. It is a world in which policing has, however haltingly and unevenly, been both stretched across the frontiers of states and charged with combating what are often overlapping problems of global organized crime and political violence."[2]*

In the above quotation, Loader and Walker make it unmistakably clear that we live in a world where we constantly deal with other states and organizations. Our economies have become intertwined, making us more and more reliable on one another and leaving us also more vulnerable. This situation calls for an effective form of global security, a type of security that not only provides us with safety, but also protects our rights as human beings.

II.   What is Cosmopolitan Security?

Cosmopolitan security is based on the idea that we all belong to a single moral community. The cosmopolitan perspective tries to offer an alternative to state-based and multilateral security perspectives. Because these security perspectives are still based on finding enemies,

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[1] Tom van der Hor is master student of International and Comparative Criminology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Criminal Law in The Netherlands.
[2] Loader, I. and N. Walker, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, EUI Working Paper Law no. 2007/17, Florence: European University Institute, 2007, at p 2.

they must be displaced or transformed by the cosmopolitan perspective[3]. The cosmopolitan perspective can offer us "*humanistic principles and norms, an assumption of human equality, with recognition of difference, and indeed a celebration of diversity*"[4]. According to Kaldor, we live in a world where we try to compel one another, mostly trying to enforce our political opinion trough 'spectacle' war. Kaldor states that compellance no longer works and the only alternative is containment[5], so rather than solving conflict by going to war the cosmopolitan perspective offers us the idea of solving conflicts by emphasizing on an open process of communication. The focus should be on transnational ties of trust, loyalty and common cause[6]. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan perspective aims to emphasize on the strengths of the global civil society and its role in creating a collective identity and solidarity on a transnational level[7].

According to Habermas, we can promote international piece and enhance international security by codifying and institutionalizing legal procedures at both the transnational and supranational level. Only then, Habermas says, power politics can be eradicated[8].

This notion of a process of open communication with a focus on transnational ties of trust, loyalty and common cause sounds very attractive. It shows similarities with the much applauded Dutch 'poldermodel'[9]. But both Mary Kaldor and Jürgen Habermas describe an ideal type of cosmopolitan security, both recognizing that the international community currently fails to follow these principles of cosmopolitan security (while it could follow these principles). And according to authors like Mark Duffield and Phillip Bobbitt, the international community will never be cosmopolitan. Duffield states that cosmopolitanism, or human security, is used as a bio-political framing that creates a permanent form of instability, which constantly calls for intervention. The West legitimizes these forms of 'social engineering' by saying that they are helping the weak and preventing them from falling into evil. But in truth, the West tries to prevent that influences and 'dangers' from these countries contaminate the

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[3] Dorn, Nicholas, *Conceptualizing Security: Cosmopolitan, State, Multilateral and Market Dynamics*, Erasmus Law Lectures (in production in August), Den Hague: Boom Juridische, 2008.

[4] Kaldor, M., *American Power: from 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?,* International Affairs, 79, 1, 2003, at p. 19.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, at p. 18.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Tambakaki, P., *Toward a Cosmopolitan Legal Order?*, International Studies Review, 10, pp. 103–105, 2008, at p. 1.

[9] The Dutch poldermodel is a model based on consensus, where employers, unions and the government meet to discuss important issues concerning labor.

West[10]. Bobbitt simply states that there is no such thing as a sovereign state any more, rather states have become 'market states' where war and conflict is seen as normal[11].

However, today's cosmopolitan security works with and trough multilateral mechanisms and in cooperation with states as well as the private security sector. This is because cosmopolitan security today has not been able to create a wide spectrum of resources of its own yet[12].

So where does cosmopolitan security stand in relation to the three other security perspectives? Is it just a composition of state-centric, multilateral and market-based security, or can cosmopolitan security really offer us a new and interesting model for future security governance? Some nuances are needed here, because these different perspectives are not necessarily incompatible and they do overlap each other, but each of them can offer us a different perspective on the complications that arise with the notion of global security[13].

A. Cosmopolitan Security in Relation to the State-centric Perspective

The state-centric security perspective emphasizes on the state as being the main provider of security for its subjects. Supporters of state-centric security see the state as the exclusive provider, or at least as the primary provider of security[14]. The problem with the state-centric perspective is the emphasis on the self-interest of states. Realists say that cooperation between states is hard to achieve and to maintain, because of the fact that all states pursue their self-interest and because of the unequal balance of state powers. Liberal thinkers do believe in the possibility of international cooperation an ultimately, international peace and order. But despite of these different points of view, both realists and liberals see the state as the dominant actor[15]. The only problem is that neither of them can provide us with a conclusive answer to how to make this work. The realists have problems finding a stable power that can balance out the colliding interests between states as well as non-state entities and the liberals can't seem to locate an international framework which can count on enough support from participating states[16]. This leaves me with the vision of the schoolyard during lunch break, where the biggest bully pursues his own self-interest by stealing the lunch of his weaker classmates.

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[10] Duffield, M., *Invitation to Terror: the Expanding Empire of the Unknown*, London: continuum, 2007.

[11] Bobbitt, P., *The of Shield of Achilles*, London: Allen Lane, 2002.

[12] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security*.

[13] Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*.

[14] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security*.

[15] Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*.

[16] Ibid.

Unfortunately, the teacher never seems to be around to balance these power differences, leaving the weaker children behind with empty stomachs.

As modern history has shown us (for instance the war against terrorism), states tend to offer security by using force. But the use of force to end a conflict tends to backfire, because the use of force in for instance Iraq creates revulsion and resistance, answered with more force from the occupying state, creating an ever wider conflict. Suhrke explains the dangers of 'undermining rather than supporting stabilization'[17], it is in fact the danger of being heavy-footed. As Mary Kaldor points out, compellance no longer works and the only alternative is containment[18]. What we need is an open process of communication, because that is what a democracy is based on; extensive discussion and the communicative rationality[19]. This is what cosmopolitan security advocates.

B. Cosmopolitan Security in Relation to the Multilateral Perspective

The concept of multilateral policing and security seems to have a lot in common with the liberal point of view on state-centric security. It also refers to forms op cooperation between states. But in contrary to the (liberal) state-centric perspective, the multilateral security perspective offers mediation between cooperating states through multilateral forums and institutions[20]. But also non-state actors can be involved in these multilateral forums and institutions. The attractiveness of the multilateral security perspective lies in the term 'mediation', implying that these multilateral forums and institutions (when a conflict arises) attempt to seek a solution that suits all involved parties. But as with state-centric security, again rises the question if you can mediate between state and non-state actors who, in the end, try to satisfy their own private interests. For example, when the World Bank decided to withdraw its financial support to the Three Gorges Dam in China because of vicious critiques, the pressure of multilateral institutions didn't seem to have much of an effect on the member states. Many European governments continued supporting the Three Gorges Dam project, because of the opportunities it created for their own firms[21].

The problem with the multilateral security perspective is that it mainly builds upon voluntary self-regulation from involved parties. Thus, voluntary self-regulation is a well

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[17] Suhrke, A., *A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,* International Peacekeeping, 15, 2, 2008, at p. 233.

[18] Kaldor, M., *American Power: from 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?*

[19] Habermas, J., *The Divided West*, Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 2006.

[20] Andreas, Peter, C*riminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy*, International Studies Quarterly, 49, 2005.

[21] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security*.

meant effort to show state and non-state actors their responsibilities on certain issues, but it will be thrown over-board as soon as it starts to get in the way of private interests. The idea of cosmopolitan security certainly has some common grounds with the multilateral security perspective, as it tries to seek the best solution in conflict situations. But as stated above, private interests seem to be at the top of the agenda, whereas from a cosmopolitan point of view, human interests or individual needs should come first. International intervention should only take place under these terms[22]. And unlike the idea of voluntary self-regulation, cosmopolitanism promotes international piece and enhances international security by codifying and institutionalizing legal procedures at the transnational and supranational levels. Power politics only can be eradicated by enforcing regulation, not by voluntary self-regulation[23].

C. Cosmopolitan Security in Relation to the Market-based Perspective

The market-based perspective sees the security issue as a matter of supply and demand. It claims that the best security can be provided, when you let actors decide for their own level and type of security. The rationale behind this perspective is that groups can define their own security needs better than the state can, because security measurements provided by the state can be experienced as inappropriate and sometimes even as being oppressive[24]. Supporters of market-based forms of security, like Jennifer Wood and Benoit Dupont[25], also point out that private security is already growing fast throughout the world. Market-based security relies on more than just one provider of security, from the point of view than no one provider of security (like the state) would be able to get it right for everyone[26].

It is true that the private security sector is a fast growing one. From companies that supply security systems for home owners to private security companies such as the American based Blackwater Inc[27], currently operating in Iraq.

But there are some problems with the market-based security perspective. On the surface, letting groups decide for their own level and type of security sounds fair. But it completely by-passes the fact that some groups are not able to decide for their own level and type of

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[22] Kaldor, M., *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention,* Polity, London, 2007, at page 113 – 114.

[23] Habermas, J., *The Divided West*.

[24] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*

[25] Dupont, B., P. Grabosky and C. Shearing, *The governance of security in weak and failing states*, Criminal Justice, vol. 3, no. 4, 2003.

[26] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*

[27] Blackwater Incorperated is an American private security force, hired by the Bush administration to help stabilizing Iraq.

security, because of the social or economic position they are in[28]. For example, a wealthy person is able to buy an alarm system for his house, but a less fortunate person probably cannot. And we can magnify this problem to a global level, where rich and powerful states can provide for their security much better than weaker states, creating a huge imbalance of power. Here we can discover the view of Phillip Bobbitt, who claims that we are already living in a world where the market-based perception rules. In this vision, war is a normal state of affairs[29]. States do no longer assure equality and security, but just want to maximize profits for society, and war is profit[30]. This perfectly illustrates that free choice is not necessarily the most fair to all. In the case of security provision it can lead to injustice and even oppression of weak groups by stronger groups[31]. With cosmopolitan security, according to Kaldor, human rights should come first. Differences between people should be recognized and we must build on the assumption of human equality. The most important question is what is best for all people[32].

Another problem with security being privatized is that the actors providing these forms of security want to make a profit. The man who sells alarm system wants to sell as much as he can. Blackwater Inc. wants to be contracted for providing security in as many areas or countries as possible, because it's their livelihood. In the words of Furedi, market-based security has an interest in 'worst-case scenario' thinking. We go from rational thinking to precautionary thinking and action[33]. Private security companies are the most profitable when people act precautionary, so profit becomes the main drive instead of providing security for everyone.

So besides creating a power imbalance between groups, market-based security also is out to 'make a buck'. This is not a preferable way to offer security to people. Instead, the cosmopolitan security perspective offers us a more balanced and fair way of providing security to all, and not only to those who can afford it.

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[28] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*
[29] Bobbitt, P., *The of Shield of Achilles*, London: Allen Lane, 2002.
[30] Palin, P. J., *Consent, Consumers, and the Constitution*; *Review of Terror and Consent: The Wars for the 21st Century by Philip Bobbitt*, Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3, October 2008.
[31] Dupont, B., P. Grabosky, and C. Shearing, *The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States.*
[32] Kaldor, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention.*
[33] Chandler, D., *Hollow Hegemony: Theorizing the Shift from Interest-Based to Value-Based International Policy-Making*, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35(3), 2007, at p. 274.

III. Developments in Bosnia and Kosovo

As stated before, these four perspectives described above overlap each other and are not necessarily incompatible[34]. We can recognize these perspectives throughout the entire conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. In order to create some sort of an overview, this article will now discuss developments in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of pre-conflict issues, outright war and post-war issues (main focus), including the four perspectives.

A. *Pre-conflict Issues*

The Yugoslav Wars consisted of a series of violent conflicts in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It took place between 1991 and 2001. Former Yugoslavia, which was a communist country, fell apart with the fall of the Soviet Union and communism itself. During these series of violent conflicts, different states intervened in different kinds of ways. But prior to the interventions, in 1992 the United Nations already imposed sanctions against the SFRY. These were comprehensive sanctions covering 'trade, air travel, financial transactions, scientific and technical cooperation, and sports and cultural exchanges'[35]. But these sanctions had unintended criminalizing effects. The goal was to stop Milosevic´ government from supporting the rebel Serbs in Bosnia and by doing so, making the Bosnian Serb leadership more willing to negotiate an end to the war. But instead, the sanctions were simply evaded. In order to evade the sanctions, the state became a 'sponsor' of organized crime in order to generate necessary funds and create supplies. The underground economy started to grow while the above ground economy went into crisis. Even worse, the sanctions created a tolerance for smuggling amongst the population of the FRY[36]. In the end, the sanctions criminalized the entire political stage, creating a nation-wide black market.

The sanctions, brought into place by the United Nations, are a good example of multilateral security. It concerns states working together, mediated by the UN, to bring a conflict to an end. But as history has shown us, the sanctions were ineffective, creating an underground economy with widespread sanction evasion.

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[34] Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*.

[35] Andreas, C*riminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy*, at p. 320.

[36] Andreas, C*riminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy*.

B. The Outright Conflict

The Bosnian War took place between March 1992 and November 1995. This war is infamous for the so called 'ethnic cleansing'[37] that took place on July 11th 1995 in Srebrenica. An estimated 8.000 Muslim men, who were supposed to be under the protection of an UN-battalion called 'Dutchat'[38], were deported and murdered by Bosniak-Serbian troops under the command of general Ratko Mladić. Roughly 600 Dutchbat peacekeepers were reduced to observers. They had no heavy artillery or air support to stop this act of genocide. This tragedy led to a debate in the Netherlands about the position of cosmopolitan security. The Dutch peacekeeping forces were ill prepared or, in the words of Kaldor, not able to contain the situation. According to Kaldor, the role of cosmopolitan security is indeed to contain the situation. But there is a role for military means in this vision, also to contain situations from escalating[39]. So the question is if cosmopolitan security is just not capable of dealing with these types of situations, or that it was just implemented in the wrong way.

Another interesting phase in the Yugoslav Wars was operation 'Storm' that took place on August 4, 1995. This was the code name given to a military operation carried out by Croatian armed forces. The objective was to retake the Krajina region from the ethnic Serbs. These Croatian armed forces were trained by a firm from the United States called Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). This engagement was approved by the United States government. This is an excellent example of state-based security. By using a private army, the U.S. avoided discussions with other states, undermining some sort of swift reaction to this problem. But by doing so, the U.S. also undermined 'state-constitutive standards of international behaviour and criminal justice'[40].

The last phase in the conflict was the NATO bombing, which can be defined as an action by states, or state-centric security. This was NATO's military operation against the FRY. It lasted from March 24 to June 10, 1999 and ended the Kosovo War, which started in 1996. The NATO bombing took place without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. In this case, NATO countries ignored cosmopolitanism and chose a state-centric approach to deal with the situation.

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[37] Ethnic cleansing, in this case, refers to the killings of members of an ethnic minority by the majority in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity.

[38] Dutchbat was a Dutch UN peace-keeping force, sent to protect the muslim-enclave during the Bosnian War.

[39] Kaldor, *American Power: from 'compellence' to cosmopolitanism?*

[40] Dorn, *Conceptualizing security: cosmopolitan, state, multilateral & market dynamics*, at p. 10.

C. *Post-conflict Issues*

On November 1995, the Bosnian War came to an end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement. It is called the Dayton Agreement, because the agreement was reached at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. It was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

The Dayton Agreement[41] produced a strategy to unite the country by producing an administration overseen by the international community in the form of an UN high representative. The UN high representative would be responsible for overseeing the political process in Bosnia. This is a typical form of multilateral security, where the international community decided, through mediation of the UN, that it would be in the best interest of Bosnia and all other states that representatives from the UN would oversee the political process in Bosnia. It also shows a cosmopolitan approach, because of the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and other cosmopolitan actors. These became actively involved, being contracted to the administering states and the UN[42]. Lord Ashdown, former UN high representative to Bosnia, emphasized on rules of good governance and anti-corruption strategies[43].

The above shouldn't pose too many problems when carried out in the right way. A country like Bosnia, torn by war and inhabited by Bosnians, Serbians and Croatians needs guidance. From the beginning there was a lot of suspicion between these three groups and during the elections, a lot of former war heroes were elected into office. From this point of view, a UN high representative emphasizing on good governance and anti-corruption strategies does seem like a necessity. But these rules of good governance were much stricter for Bosnia than they are for most Western democracies, where no one expects of government officials that they should resign just on basis of allegations concerning corruption, which haven't even been proven yet in a court of law[44]. This is what happened in Bosnia, al lot of government officials were forced to resign from their office on the basis of mere allegations. This was justified by the UN high Representatives by stating that Bosnia needed 'proper

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[41] *US State Department, Summary of The Dayton Peace Agreement, fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs,* December 11, 1995.

[42] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*

[43] Chandler, *Hollow Hegemony: Theorizing the Shift from Interest-Based to Value-Based International Policy-Making*, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35(3), 2007.

[44] Chandler, *Building trust in public institutions? Good governance and anti-corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina,* Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, pp. 85–99, Taylor & Francis Group.

governance and transparency'[45]. Other important issues, like international administration or ethnic nationalism were to take a back seat.

As a result, Bosnia's citizens lost their confidence in the institutions of the Bosnian state. Elections became unpopular and politics simply stagnated, which resulted in a stagnating economy as well because no investments were made in the country. This led to the continuation of the grey economy, which is actually a very logical step. In this post-sanction period, the emphasis was on good governance and fighting corruption in the political arena. With the international focus on dealing with corruption on state-level and not on dealing with corruption created or continued by major forms of crime[46], underground economic activities which were already in place simply continued their activities. Meanwhile, the aboveground economy is still recovering from the sanctions, making the underground economy more attractive and profitable. After living under these sanctions for a long time, the Bosnians continued to accept smuggling and other illegal economic activities[47].

Sadly, the UN high representatives failed to recognize these developments as well as Sam Gejdenson's statement that these corruption problems were 'grossly overstated'[48] and that the problems faced by Bosnia were no different from other newly emerging democracies in that region[49]. Whereas the multilateral security perspective seems to be suffering from tunnel vision in this particular case, cosmopolitan actors (some NGO workers) already saw that the corruption in Bosnia was not that organized nor as sophisticated[50], while other NGOs and cosmopolitan actors were actually involved in the process, being contracted to the administering states and the UN, adding to the imbalance of the political power in Bosnia[51].

The focus of the international administrators on anti-corruption strategies and implementing good governance in Bosnia did not help to restore trust of Bosnian citizen in the political system. Better yet, it undermined it by ignoring the political choices of the Bosnian citizen, not allowing them meaningful participation in the political process. But meaningful participation for Bosnian citizens and public accountability for politicians who are being suspected of corruption are essential in helping to restore the trust in the institutions of the

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[45] Chandler, D., *Building trust in public institutions?*, 2006, at p. 86.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Andreas, *Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy.*
[48] Chandler, D., *"The Politics of Corruption and the Corruption of Politics": A Case Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Presentation for the 2nd ECPR Conference, Marburg, 18-21 September 2003, at p. 4.
[49] Wolfson, P., *Bosnia corruption*, Voice of America, 15 September, 1999.
[50] CILE, *Corruption and anti-corruption measures in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Final Report of the Commission of International Legal Experts*, 25 February, 2000.
[51] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*

Bosnian state. But instead, international administrators used the allegations of corruption in order to impose their own will on Bosnia's political process[52].

Cosmopolitanism did have some influence in the post-conflict governance in Bosnia, in the form of the international criminal tribunal law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) came into existence solely because of cosmopolitan efforts[53]. According to Bass, NGOs were able to convince the liberal member of the UN Security Council of establishing such tribunals[54]. It is said that after the establishment, the ICTY needed the states resources much more than it needed the NGOs[55]. But this doesn't erase the fact that Cosmopolitanism in a way gave birth to the ICTY and ICC.

IV. Cosmopolitan Security and its Shortcomings

Throughout this article, it has become clear that the idea of cosmopolitan security is presented as a more preferable way of providing security than state-centric security, multilateral security or market-based security. This does not mean that cosmopolitan security is flawless and should be seen as some sort of utopian vision on security. Cosmopolitan security indeed has its shortcoming. We will now look at some of these shortcomings.

A perfect example of failing cosmopolitan security must be Dutchbat. On July 11th 1995, an estimated 8.000 Muslim men, who were supposed to be under the protection of an UN-battalion called 'Dutchat', were deported and murdered by Bosniak-Serbian troops under the command of general Ratko Mladić. Dutchbat came in as a peacekeeping force. But due to the fact that they were ill prepared for conflict, they were not able to stop this tragedy from happening. Here we can see 'good intention' politics that can originate from cosmopolitan ideas and thoughts. If the intervention would have been preceded by a more well-rounded debate, than maybe the Netherlands would have been able to foresee these problems prior to the actual intervention[56].

Another shortcoming or weakness of cosmopolitan security is the role that it has taken in international anti-corruption campaigns. As we have seen in the case of Bosnia, the focus on anti-corruption strategies undermines democracy and is counterproductive in the

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[52] Chandler, D., *Building trust in public institutions? Good governance and anti-corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina.*
[53] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*
[54] Bass, G., *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, at p. 268.
[55] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*
[56] Ibid.

development of citizens' trust in politics. From this point of view, cosmopolitan security is as much responsible for the political disempowerment of Bosnia as state actors are. In this way, it actually contributes to what it in theory aims to prevent; a state centric perspective on security[57].

The writings of Habermas on cosmopolitan security are also rightfully being challenged by Paulina Tambakini. Habermas believes that we can promote international piece and enhance international security by codifying and institutionalizing legal procedures at the transnational and supranational levels, in order to eradicate power politics[58]. Tambakaki simply asks herself the question, if this is all that is required for a transition to cosmopolitanism, than why has this not happened yet?[59] Habermas fails to provide us with an answer. Habermas also says that we can reach common ground through mutual perspective taking[60]. But is it realistic to expect that states will set aside their national priorities and even discard their own values in order to reach a mutual understanding necessary for global cooperation? According to Tambakaki, here lies another weakness of Habermas argument for cosmopolitan security.

There are three other weaknesses or 'stumbling blocks' that cosmopolitan security has to deal with. The first one is the fact that cosmopolitanism is not totally protected against self-interests, meaning that even NGOs can lose track of the actual cause and pursue their own private interests. This happened in Bosnia where NGOs and other cosmopolitan actors got actively involved, being contracted to the administering states and the UN. By doing so, they added to the imbalance of the political power in Bosnia[61].

The second one can be described as cosmopolitan security being utopianism. For example, the well intentioned but poorly planned intervention in Srebrenica by Dutchbat. That's why both the successes and the failures of cosmopolitan security need to be studied closer, looking for inspiration in the successful initiatives[62].

And thirdly, cosmopolitan security has to deal with its Eurocentric reputation. This means that cosmopolitan security is western security, with western traditions. There are a lot of countries that do not follow or believe in the western traditions and values. That is why cosmopolitan security must avoid becoming a way of imposing western values on non-western countries. The difficult thing about this is that advancing cosmopolitan security

[57] Dorn, *Conceptualizing security: cosmopolitan, state, multilateral & market dynamics*.
[58] Habermas, J., *The Divided West.*
[59] Tambakaki, P., *Toward a Cosmopolitan Legal Order?*
[60] Habermas, J., *The Divided West.*
[61] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*
[62] Ibid.

internationally would mean that it has to make serious compromises with non-western countries and traditions[63].

V.   Conclusion: Cosmopolitan Security as a Future Model?

We live in a world with multi-source security, meaning that right now, all four perspectives play a valuable part in providing security. The question is what the dynamics are between these perspectives[64].

Cosmopolitan security, especially in the words of Mary Kaldor and Jürgen Habermas, provides us with a utopian-like form of global security. Utopian-like, because both Kaldor and Habermas acknowledge that the international community currently fails to implement or follow the basic rules if you will, that they provide in their theory. The theory that stresses the importance of containment instead of compellence, putting human security first, acknowledging the process of discussion and codifying and institutionalizing legal procedures at the transnational and supranational levels[65].

Of course, cosmopolitan security has its shortcomings like the other three perspectives on global security. But contrary to the state-centric, multilateral and market-based security perspectives, cosmopolitan security really does aim for global security based on 'humanistic principles and norms, an assumption of human equality, with recognition of difference, and indeed a celebration of diversity'[66]. The state-centric, multilateral and market-based security perspectives tend to put their self-interests (either political or economical) first and the interests of other involved parties second.

We established that today's cosmopolitan security works with and trough multilateral mechanisms and in cooperation with states and the private security sector, because cosmopolitan security has not yet been able to create its own resources[67]. This is not necessarily a bad thing. As cosmopolitan-based as both Kaldor and Bauman are, neither of them claim that states are not important. Kaldor said that globalization means that states have to transform, though she is not sure in what direction[68].

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Dorn, Nicholas, *Multi-source Governance and the Balkans:Iinter-State Relations, Solidaristic Mechanisms and Cosmopolitan Networks in the Formation of Administrative Measures and Criminal Law*, paper given at Second Annual HUMSEC conference, Sarajevo., 2007.

[65] Habermas, *The Divided West.*

[66] Kaldor, *American Power: from 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?*

[67] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security.*

[68] Kaldor, *American Power: from 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?*

From a normative point of view, Loader and Walker make a strong point when they say that security lies with the sovereign states and cosmopolitan actors. But it is important that cosmopolitan actors are first place, preventing states from going after private interests.

But the cosmopolitan security perspective must learn from and come to terms with the security initiatives that it has produces so far[69]. For example, Dutchbat or the anti-corruption strategies in post-conflict governance in Bosnia.

Cosmopolitan security, as it stands right now, has much to offer. But it is also a form of security still in its infancy and thus, has a lot left to learn. Until that day, our modern day society still has a long way to go from providing security because we fear one another to providing security to protect each other. Fear of each other is based on ignorance, something that our modern world should have been able to overcome by now. We should not fear each other, instead we should fear ignorance. Ignorance is our only common enemy and if we do not defeat it, than "*I think we risk becoming the best informed society that has ever died of ignorance.*"[70]

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[69] Dorn, *Conceptualizing Security*.

[70] Blade, Ruben, available online at: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/r/ruben_blades.html