Greater Horn of Eastern Africa (GHEA) Outlook

#22

Being Young in the GHEA:
Perceptions, Expectations and Reality

Society for International Development

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1. Introduction

East Africa's population of children under the age of fifteen increased from 53.3 million in 2005 to 61 million in 2010. Children made up 45% of East Africa's population in 2005 and 44% in 2010. Looking ahead to 2030, the estimated population of children under the age of 15 will be 96 million, making up 41% of the region's 237 million people. East Africa's youths (aged 15 to 34 years), was estimated at 48 million or 35% of the total population in 2010. By 2030, the 82 million young people will still account for 35% of the total population. In total, East Africa's 109 million children and youth made up 80% of the total population in 2010 and this population group will grow to 178 million by 2030, and its share will remain a significant 75% of the region's total population.

Defining Youth in East Africa

Defining institution or country	Youth age range	Remarks
UN General Assembly	15-24	
World Health Organisation (WHO)	10-19	Youngest & narrowest age range (10 years)
Commonwealth	15-29	
African Union	15-35	Oldest upper age
Burundi	15-26	
Kenya (Constitution)	18-34	Shortest transition (16 years)
Rwanda (National Youth Policy)	14-35	Oldest upper age and longest transition (22 years)
Tanzania (National Youth Development Policy, 2007)	15-35	Oldest upper age
Uganda (National Youth Policy, 2001)	12-30	Youngest lower age

A person leaves childhood and becomes a youth earliest in Uganda (12 years) and latest in Kenya (18 years). Youth ends earliest by the WHO definition (19 years) and UN General Assembly (24 years). The oldest youth are to be found in Rwanda, Tanzania, and African Union definitions. The transition between childhood and adulthood is longest (22 years) in Rwanda, and shortest (10 years) by the WHO and UN General Assembly definitions.

Much of the research on the youth in East Africa tends to focus on three main issues – education and training, access to health services with an accent on sexual and reproductive health, and jobs. This GHEA Outlook approaches the subject from a slightly different perspective. It summarises the findings of two recent papers by the United States Institute of Peace that explore how poor and vulnerable youth in Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan view their prospects for the future, and how this is influenced by their struggle and success at transitioning from childhood into adulthood. It is suggested that marriage is central to the social definition of adulthood, and the ease with which young people can get married and start a family is an important influence on their outlook on the future. This GHEA Outlook proposes that there is a 'price of adulthood' that is primarily determined by social

convention. However, a strong state can also determine this price, with some surprising results on young people's perception of their future prospects.

This Outlook also reports in the results of two new surveys of young people in Uganda and across East Africa. It concludes by proposing that some research be done on Rwanda's *imidugudu* policy to see if it has an impact on young people's livelihood options and strategies. It also highlights a specific opportunity to address the 'soft skills' shortage that was identified as critical by employers but appeared to be invisible or unimportant to the young people themselves.

2. Summary of recent trend research

2.1 Youth in Rwanda and Burundi – Contrasting Visions[i]

Notions of adulthood.
In both Rwanda and Burundi, adulthood is defined socially by marriage and the possibilities of providing for a family. Movement toward manhood and womanhood are linked, and achieving them relies on the ability of male youth to meet their first challenge. To marry, a male youth must first provide housing for his future wife and children. Marriage and giving birth to children are also prerequisites of socially acceptable womanhood.

National policies have significantly exacerbated the already intense adulthood pressures on male and female youth. The Rwandan government is in the process of changing the housing of the majority of Rwandans in rural areas. More than 80 percent of all Rwandans currently reside in rural areas, and the government plans to move nearly all rural dwellers into *imidugudu*, or community housing areas. As a government official explained, "[Male] youth who construct new houses will be directed to an *umudugudu*, and by 2030, the government vision is to have 80 percent of the population living on *imidugudu*." Strict government regulations require all new houses to be built on an *umudugudu*, and… that all houses…must be fairly large, with at least two bedrooms. Deforestation legislation that was in force (for environmental protection reasons) during the 2006–07 fieldwork period, moreover, caused a sharp jump in the price of roof tiles.

Research found that working to save money to buy roofing is the main priority for most male youth in rural Rwanda. This often meant that male youth left primary school early to try to collect as many roof tiles as they could. Many female youth did the same: some felt that if they managed to accumulate some savings (by farming for others for two hundred francs a day), they might be able to attract a potential male youth for informal marriage (illegal but widely practiced without sanction in both Rwanda and Burundi).

In Burundi, young men and women (and their parents) largely shared the same ideals of normative manhood. For them, building a house, getting married, and starting a family were at the core of their expectations. Rwandan-style regulations do not exist in Burundi. This made life (for now at least) less difficult for Burundian male youth: they had more freedom to choose to build where and how they wanted,

at lower cost. Thus, Burundians young and old said that people nowadays marry later than they used to; they engaged in informal marriage that society found acceptable; and instead of building a house, a male youth could simply build a room next to the house of his parents, marry a female youth, and begin married life. Although all three of these alternatives were also found in Rwanda, Rwandan youth and adults considered them embarrassments and signs of social failure. Building any new house or shelter outside of an *umudugudu* in Rwanda was illegal as well.

Ways Out? Education and Migration

Education. In the research in Burundi, education was "the single issue that came up most in the conversations about how (young) people try to make it in life. It is at the heart of individual social mobility and family strategies for survival." Some 85 percent of those interviewed in Burundi spontaneously brought up education. In Rwanda, virtually the opposite situation prevailed: only 12 percent of rural youth respondents to a question about their future plans included education. A mere 4 percent mentioned training. The proportions were even smaller among urban youth, where less than 6 percent of respondents mentioned education or training as a component of their plans.

Why is there a far deeper attachment to education in Burundi than in Rwanda? One compelling explanation arises from the sharply contrasting outlooks of youth on their future. Rwandan youth elicited a strong emphasis on practicality, on not hoping for something—such as a good education—that, in their view, they will never get. The idea for most undereducated Rwandan youth was that you have to first accept your plight, and then sculpt a life as best as you can.

In Burundi, in pointed contrast, even though the education system is poorly equipped and organized, people were more in tune with the opportunities inherent in education: if parents had the luck of having a truly smart child, then they might possess the "lottery ticket" needed to get their family away from farming and out of poverty.

Migration. Another significant difference between the twin research endeavors relates to how youth assessed the prospect of urban migration as a means to improve their lives. Rwandan youth in villages and in Kigali primarily viewed rural–urban migration as an escape from humiliation and failure in rural areas rather than a way out of impoverishment.

Rural and urban youth in Rwanda scarcely ever mentioned any wonders of city life and its various attractions. Since Kigali was a place where people went and might never return, it was mainly a destination for the desperate, not the inquisitive or the dynamic. For Burundian youth, especially male youth, on the other hand, urban migration was a desirable option—risky and difficult for sure, but associated with the potential for success.

Urban migrant youth themselves, when interviewed in Bujumbura and Kigali, were far more pleased with their decision in Burundi than in Rwanda. Indeed, in Bujumbura, about half of the people interviewed in the poor neighborhoods

(*quartiers populaires*) considered their lives better than their parents'. Nothing of the sort surfaced among urban youth in Rwanda, where most considered Kigali life exceptionally bleak.

Prospects and Limits of Social Mobility
While youth in both countries believed that downward social mobility was more likely than upward social mobility, the commanding imprint of risk aversion, so prominent among Rwandan youth, was far less apparent in Burundian youth. Ironically, Burundian youth seemed to have the sort of attunement to new ideas and innovations that Rwandan government officials tried so hard to inculcate in Rwandan youth.

One possible explanation for this difference lies in divergent attitudes toward the state. Young Burundians spoke frequently about their families as sources of support; even in the capital city, where many bemoaned the decline of community aid and family support, they gave examples of its continuing occurrence. Burundian youth also never mentioned the state when they described their plans for the future. There were clearly few expectations that the state would support their progress.

[In] Rwanda, most youth had little to no expectation that families could help them all that much. The Rwandan government, on the other hand, was an entirely different story. Regardless of whether the comments referred to youth being "prisoners" of government regulations or that "the government is our parent," having the government "close to us" was a persistent, recurring Rwandan refrain.

At the same time, the Rwandan government's general approach to youth challenges is both directive and entirely at odds with the priorities of most Rwandan youth. In interview after interview, Rwandan government officials emphatically asserted that out-of-school youth should work together in associations to achieve mutual gain. Yet in Rwanda as in Burundi, most youth quietly resisted joining associations and viewed their pathway ahead as individuals.

The strength of the State
The striking determination of the Rwandan government to sculpt poor youth lives may be explained by the fact that the state has historically been—and still is—far stronger in Rwanda than in Burundi…The reach of today's Rwandan state is expansive; its tendency toward pervasive social engineering, which is at least partially in response to the very difficult post genocidal context with which it has had to contend since coming to power, is illuminated in its approach toward housing, marriage, the informal economy, the environment, and public health. The Rwandan government dominates the social and economic lives of its citizens in ways that far exceed neighboring Burundi. There, most Burundians, during the last decades and culminating with the civil war of 1993–2002, have come to expect less and less of their state. As a result, Burundians have learned to work around their government, to avoid it, and to count on their own resources as much as possible.

In short, a strong and controlling state coexists with, and reinforces, a risk-averse and quietly resistant population in Rwanda, whereas in Burundi a weak and easily subverted state coexists with a more dynamic and flexible young population.

2.2 Dowry and division – Youth and State Building in South Sudan[ii]

Some South Sudan statistics.
Available statistical information paints a startling picture. Just over half of the population lives below the poverty line, one in seven children dies before age five, and an astounding 92 percent of women are illiterate. School achievement rates for youth are low: only 4 percent of males ages fourteen to seventeen and 2 percent of their female counterparts are in secondary school, and every vocational training and technical education school in South Sudan was "shut down for all or part" of the recent civil war.

Gender and the Dowry Economy.
Female youth are disproportionately disadvantaged due, in part, to the high prevalence of early marriage: the 2008 South Sudan census estimates that two in five girls marry before age eighteen and 11 percent marry before age fifteen.

Male and female youth must marry to be recognized as adults; however, male youth are under severe pressure to meet escalating dowry costs. High unemployment, low levels of educational accomplishment, and disturbances in trade with Sudan have significantly diminished avenues for economic success. An unpublished UN report states that dowry prices have grown by 44 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

In pastoralist South Sudan, dowries are measured in cattle: "You cannot marry without cows," one youth explained, "and you cannot be called a man without cows." In agricultural areas, payments can combine money with cattle or other livestock. There were steady descriptions of a difficult situation getting much worse. "The number of cattle in Unity State is declining," a male youth in Bentiu explained, "while the price of dowry is going up." "Dowry is the biggest challenge in Southern Sudan," an urban male youth stated simply.

Sky-high dowry rates have devastated male youth, too. Some venture into Uganda or Kenya to marry local women, whose dowry prices are lower. Two veteran international agency officials reported that the Shilluk king has set a dowry limit of ten cows per marriage. As a result, one of them explained, youth from "other tribes seek to marry Shilluk girls because they're cheaper."

A complex employment landscape.
The public spaces of towns and cities in South Sudan are clogged with so-called idlers, male youth without jobs. Usually well dressed, they sit in large groups for countless hours, under trees and near shops, markets, and homes. Many play cards or lado, a popular board game. Others habitually glance at their mobile phones. These male youth personify what may be South Sudan's most pressing development problem: vast swaths of unemployed youth.

The youth unemployment situation persists for at least four important reasons.

1. First, there is an overwhelming focus on a finite number of government jobs. Even youth without competitive skills, training, or education tend to neglect

technical training, because it is thought to have nothing to do with government work.

2. [The] second reason for South Sudan's youth unemployment situation (is): widespread nepotism. An unemployed male youth in Juba explained, "We [unemployed youth] are just pushing time. At times when we look for jobs, it's not easy to find them. When we go to the [government] offices, we find tribalism. They ask for your tribe, and if it's the wrong one, you cannot get a job." A national government official noted, "the youth look to government because it's the only employer. The private sector is not yet [present]." Regarding government hiring practices, the official said that "corruption is there, tribalism is there, favoritism is there. I am confirming what youth are saying about this."

3. A third reason for the dire youth unemployment situation is that South Sudanese youth refuse to do many jobs. Many youth reported that selling water, clearing land, doing construction, cleaning buildings or outdoor areas, and working in hotels and restaurants invite derisive and humiliating criticism from peers, relatives, and elders. A senior government official stated that the reason youth refuse such jobs "is cultural. Some jobs are not suitable."…Distaste for such work is so great that an unemployed male youth conceivably will join a militia or gang sooner than carry out menial labor in South Sudan. A high-level international security official observed, "If you give a [male] youth a gun, that's a means to employment. He can loot, ambush, stop cars, and get money."

4. A fourth reason for high youth unemployment is related to the third. Some South Sudanese maintain unrealistic views of their earning potential and viability as workers. With considerable frustration, a government official in Unity State said, "South Sudanese youth are so selective. They only want to do white collar jobs. Even youth with no education expect a [white collar] job." And until the right job comes around, evidently, many male youth sit and wait. There appears to be a pronounced lack of entrepreneurial vision among many South Sudanese youth.

Youth and the new government – tokenism?
Although youth of all backgrounds view the government as the primary source of education, employment, and hope, interviews with government officials at the national, state, and county levels suggest that the government of South Sudan is not poised to fulfill vital youth priorities (with the possible exception of education, as noted earlier).

Disappointment and frustration over government responses to youth needs, and the marginalization of youth voices in government policy, were consistent among elite youth regardless of their location…Notably, many of the elite youth the authors interviewed recognized the prominent role of youth in protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. These young people expressed hope that South Sudanese youth would peacefully protest should the government fail to live up to its promises. There was no evidence of an organized response in the making.

Officials rarely mentioned the government's Youth Parliament, which contains youth representatives from all ten states and many political parties. The authors' research

indicates that the Youth Parliament is essentially inoperative and mostly unknown.

2.3 YouthMap Uganda[iii]

On Education.
While formal education is highly respected in Ugandan culture, a paradigm shift is occurring with youth more open and positively inclined towards vocational training than their elders. Facing high poverty and unemployment rates (estimated at 36% for university graduates), YouthMap participants expressed keen interest in training that would enable them to earn a decent livelihood. Several recent evaluations have demonstrated vocational training programs to have positive economic and social impacts on youth. A growing number of youth recognise the value of vocational training.

On Employment.
With 33 percent of working YouthMap participants employed, Ugandan youth demonstrate an entrepreneurial drive that is in itself a national asset. Many already involved in petty trading, small manufacturing, or agriculture-related work. Despite popular perceptions that youth are not interested in agriculture, many youth expressed strong interest in agriculture. In fact, 41 percent are already engaging in agriculture-related work such as crop farming, agro-processing and animal farming.

On Health and family formation.
With 25 percent of Ugandan women nationally reporting their first sexual encounter was coerced, the issue of gender-based violence (GBV) is of great concern. Married youth and those with children are a particularly vulnerable population that has received less attention than other out-of-school youth because they often face limited mobility, reduced access to media, and limited autonomy. YouthMap participants were eager for more information about STI/HIV prevention, contraception and family planning.

On Citizenship and Engagement
Youth reported feeling marginalized and manipulated by their political leadership; dismissed by their leaders; and ill-served by the programs designed to serve them. The majority of YouthMap participants were cynical about national politics and government programs.

> *"One young man in Masindi noted there was still a long way to go before youth achieved real participation: " When you have no money, you cannot be voted [for]. To campaign nowadays requires money. I joined politics to improve my welfare. We the youth have the potential to lead but no money at all. We are being labeled as future leaders, but when will the future come? The political leaders are not implementing the programs. Our leaders are talking the talk but not walking the walk."*

Despite this cynicism, 93 percent of YouthMap participants were registered to vote and 60 percent were engaged in civic activities. They expressed a desire to participate in politics to make a positive change and an enthusiasm for helping their own communities.

2.6 Holla East Africa Youth Survey[iv]

First launched in 2002 and conducted every two years ever since, Holla offers valuable insights into the lifestyles and consumption habits of the youth in the region. To put Holla together, researchers at Consumer Insight cross the East African region every two years. Using a structured questionnaire, they talk to male and female youths aged 7 to 24, living in urban and peri-urban areas collecting data on the youths' lifestyle choices, media exposure and usage, and product usage habits. The sample sizes are 1200 youths per country.



Given the speed with which trends change amongst the youth, every new Holla has new revelations about the youth of the region: Holla 2011 is no exception. One of its most astounding revelations is that our youth are obsessed with material success. And not just the teen or post-teen youths – a nine-year old respondent told researchers that what he wants is Mulla (youthspeak for cash money); not for buying sweets or toys or playtime on a computer game, but so he can build a mansion and buy big cars for going to fun places to buy fine stuff – like trendy clothes and shoes.

Across East Africa, the youth share this trait, but it is the Ugandan youth that is hungriest for cash and material affluence, followed closely by Kenya, then Tanzania. This obsession with money is also reflected in many a youth whose dream in life is to become a professional or a famous personality or a leader, all deemed to lead to huge cash rewards and material affluence. This notion that we are raising a generation of money-mad buccaneers should be a cause of worry for future human resource managers - especially because "Work" scores the lowest under "Most Important Things in Life."



Other points to ponder:

- The youth of East Africa are, by far, more switched on and connected than most people would imagine. Whereas there were no significant numbers of lines amongst the youth in the region only a few years ago, the situation is now completely different with 52% of all East African youth claiming to have active SIM cards (94% of those have handsets).
- Together, the youth of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania spend a mind-boggling US$ 70 million on phone airtime every month (US$ 38 million, US$ 20 million and US$ 12 million for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania respectively).
- Slightly over a third of all the youth in East Africa are connected to the Internet. More than half (68%) are on social networks, 90% of which are on Facebook. Kenyan youths are the most connected (49%), followed by Tanzanian and Ugandan youths at 30% and 26% respectively.
- The youths' No. 1 source of happiness is socialization with family (45%) and friends (29%). This is consistent with their fascination with social networks especially Facebook.

3. Key Insights

Insight #1 – Social definition of 'youth' and the 'price' of adulthood

This GHEA Outlook has noted that "youth" is defined both formally (officially) and socially. The formal definition is used to inform a set of official rights and entitlements from the state, such as access to health and education services and protection from harm and deprivation. A person's age is a key determinant of their formal status. The social definition is bounded by the set of family and community responsibilities expected from the individual. In Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan, marital status is central to whether one is socially defined as a youth or as an adult, and this perspective is prevalent across the region. If formally one crosses into adulthood at the age of 26 (Burundi), 30 (Uganda) or 35 (Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda), socially this happens when one gets married. So one can remain a youth, in the social sense, as long as one is not married even if one is beyond the formal age range of youth.

It was also clear that the ability to marry and establish a household is strongly influenced by the individual's economic and financial capacity. In Rwanda, the requirement to build a house to state-regulated specifications of location, size and roofing materials raised the 'social price' of adulthood. While different economic forces are at play in South Sudan, the resulting increase in the price of dowry (cattle) similarly raises the social price of adulthood in that country. Interestingly, for Burundi youth, the price of adulthood seems to be more affordable as society there has taken a pragmatic view to the considerable economic challenge of starting a family.

Insight #2 – Poor and vulnerable youth may be better off in a weak state

The research highlighted in this Outlook point to the poor and vulnerable youth in Rwanda being largely resigned to their fate, those in Burundi being somewhat more energised and entrepreneurial, and those in South Sudan displaying an elevated level of entitlement. Interestingly and innovatively, the authors attribute the different attitudes between Rwandan and Burundian youth to the strength of the state.

It would appear that in Rwanda's case, a very strong state with a penchant for detailed social engineering may be having the unintended effect of severely circumscribing its young people's opportunity space. Burundi's weaker state apparently leaves its youth with a wider range of options to meet their objectives and aspirations. If one takes the view that poor youth who are optimistic about their life chances are preferred to peers who are despondent and resigned to their fate, then Rwanda's strong state may, in this narrow sense, actually be counterproductive.

In this same vein, it is worth examining the extent to which the state can (or should) determine the 'price' of adulthood, given that this is an important determinant of young people's sense of achievement. The example of the South Sudanese Shilluk King's decree limiting dowry to 10 cows per marriage is instructive and may be worthy of emulation. He has set an upper limit to the 'social price' of adulthood and it would appear that this has allowed more women in his community to cross that all important threshold. In contrast, by requiring that new houses (and households) be established in a prescribed manner in Rwanda (in imidugudu, with a minimum size and roofing materials), the 'official price of adulthood' in Rwanda has been raised. This may be resulting in more 'informal' marriages, a form of quasi-adulthood accompanied by a hint of social disapproval. Whether the reduction of the 'official price' through the relaxation of the requirements (e.g., the recommended size of the new house) would lead to an expansion in the demand for socially acceptable adulthood is an interesting research question.

Insight #3 – Divergent perceptions and expectations

A collection of additional insights are hinted at by the research, some of which challenge the conventional perceptions about the region's youth.

One oft-repeated concern is that the region's huge youth population is largely un- or underemployed when it is out of school. However, the finding from the Holla Youth Survey on young people's monthly spend on airtime is surprising. At $70 million per month, this translates to an annual spend by seven to 24 year-olds of $840 million.

The younger children and youth are very likely financed by the older youth or adults in their lives, but clearly young people have access to significant discretionary incomes making them an important class of consumer.

The insight that there is a mismatch between employer's expectations and young people's skills set is not new. However on closer reading of the research what emerges is interesting; employers are keen on "soft skills" – teamwork, communications, and presentation. Employers surveyed in Uganda also noted the lack of soft skills such as problem-solving, work ethic and creative or critical thinking. But young people are either unaware of this or regard this skills set as unimportant. A survey conducted in Rwanda between March and May 2011 found that soft skills training was the least preferred compared to entrepreneurial and vocational training[v]. Therein lies an opportunity for new and creative interventions to help bridge this specific soft skills gap that is visible to employers but is seemingly much less so to young job-seekers.

Finally, young people prefer to be guided, rather than herded. This insight comes out of the observation that 'most youth [in Rwanda and Burundi] quietly resisted joining associations and viewed their pathway ahead as individuals.' It is consistent with the experience of the "JK's billions" in Tanzania and "Kazi Kwa Vijana" youth employment schemes [see the earlier GHEA Outlook on The Jobs Challenge] where such a cooperative approach has struggled to achieve sustainability. The Holla survey's findings also point to a more individual set of dreams and aspirations – to be rich, professional, famous – than a collectivist one. This suggests that governments would do well to rethink their approach to livelihood enhancement programmes aimed at young people.

Insight #4 – A surprising Rwandan irony and an inconvenient reality

There is of course nothing monolithic or homogeneous about 48 million East African youth. Observation and intuition clearly show that they differ widely in character, circumstance and outlook. However, in much of the literature analysing their issues and proposing interventions, they are often treated as a single unit (for example general references to 'youth' unemployment, 'youth' sexual and reproductive health, the youth 'voice'). This GHEA Outlook suggests that a more useful understanding of being young in Eastern Africa is possible when one's mind is open to diversity and surprise.

For example, it is ironic that in a country which focuses relentlessly on investing in its human resources as a pillar of its development strategy – witness the recent recruitment of 4,000 Kenyan teachers to assist with teaching English, and the establishment of Carnegie Mellon University-Rwanda (CMU-R) Masters degree in IT - few of Rwanda's young people see education as crucial to their individual future. The outcome is at odds with the intent. This is in sharp contrast to neighbouring Burundi and Uganda where education is seen as central to the improvement of individual prospects. It will be interesting to see how Rwanda resolves this seemingly deep disconnect between expanding educational opportunity and the perception by its young people that they cannot access it.

More generally, the trends show that young people would rather not be 'collectivised' as a way of obtaining assistance for their livelihood needs (funding, training, infrastructure). That they are more individualistic should not really be surprising. But it may still be an uncomfortable reality that has yet to be accepted by those who develop and deliver interventions founded on a more 'traditional' set of assumptions about collective action and group-based income generation. These are strengthening signals that group-based intervention models should be re-thought in favour of more customised approaches. While young people can and probably still ought to be taught in groups, the execution of the livelihood strategy (especially any business or income generating activity) should probably be done by individuals and supported at that level.

Endnotes

[i] Sommers, Marc and Peter Uvin, *Youth in Rwanda and Burundi: Contrasting Visions*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 293, October 2011

[ii] Sommers, Marc and Stephanie Schwartz, *Dowry and Division: Youth and State Building in South Sudan*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 295, November 2011

[iii] International Youth Foundation, *Navigating Challenges. Charting Hope: A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis of Youth in Uganda*, October 2011

[iv] Excerpts of presentation obtained through private communications. The Holla Youth Survey is referenced further in the website: http://www.ciafrica.com/oindex/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=50

[v] International Youth Foundation, *Assessment Report: Rwanda Labour Market and Youth Survey,* May 2011